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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
CITY OF ST. GEORGE, ] 
Plaintiff/Respondent, ] 
vs. 
ELZA E. MILLER, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
i Case No. 890636-CA 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal in this 
matter pursuant to U.C.A. 1953, Sec. 78--2a-3 (2) (c) Replacement 
Volume 9, 1987 Ed., and Rule 3(a) of the Rules of the Utah Court 
of Appeals. 
1 
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
Appeal followed a jury verdict in Washington County Fifth 
Circuit Court, Criminal Case No. 891000968, finding Appellant 
guilty of violating Sec. 1102(a), Uniform Plumbing Code as 
adopted by St. George, a Class B misdemeanor. An Affidavit of 
Bias and Prejudice filed by Defendant on July 12, 1989, was 
certified to Judge Dean E. Conder for a ruling on the 
sufficiency, and on July 19, 1989, Judge Conder found 
insufficient grounds for disqualification. The case was tried to 
a jury on October 3, 1989; Appellant's Motion for a Directed 
Verdict at the close of the Respondent's case was denied; 
Appellant's Motion for Judgment n.o.v. was denied; sentencing 
imposed a fine of $750.00, $500.00 of which was suspended for a 
period of one year on condition that the obstruction be removed 
from the Hopkins' water line where it traverses property of the 
Appellant. 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED 
Whether the Appellant charged with willfully placing a stone 
in the portion of a neighbor's (Hopkins) sewer lateral that 
traverses a portion of his backyard received a fair trial. 
Specifically, the questions raised are: 
(1) Whether the evidence was sufficient: 
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(a) to show that a thing was placed into a private or 
public sewer that could cause damage thereto; and 
(b) to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
Appellant was the person responsible for such 
object being placed in the sewer. 
(2) Whether the Court properly excluded evidence of the 
prior relationship between Appellant and a tenant on the Hopkins' 
property. 
(3) Whether the trial judge committed error in not recusing 
himself from the matter. 
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STATUTORY PROVISIONS CONSIDERED DETERMINATIVE 
The Uniform Plumbing Code as adopted by the City of St. 
George stating: 
(a) It shall be unlawful for any person to deposit, by any 
means whatsoever, into any plumbing fixture, floor 
drain, interceptor, sump, receptacle or device which is 
connected to any drainage system, public sewer, private 
sewer, septic tank or cesspool any ashes, cinders, 
solids, rags, flammable, poisonous or explosive liquids 
or gases, oils, grease and any other thing whatsoever 
which would, or could cause damage to the public sewer, 
private sewer or private sewage disposal system. 
Rule 29 of Criminal Procedure, Sec. 77-35-29, U.C.A. 
stating: 
(c) If the prosecution or a defendant in any criminal 
action or proceedings shall file an affidavit that 
the judge before whom such action or proceeding is 
to be tried or heard has a bias or prejudice, 
either against such party or his attorney or in 
favor of any opposing party to the suit, such 
judge shall proceed no further therein until the 
challenge is disposed of. Every such affidavit 
shall state the facts and the reasons for the 
belief that such bias or prejudice exists and 
shall be filed as soon as practicable after the 
case has been assigned or such bias or prejudice 
is known. No such affidavit shall be filed unless 
accompanied by a certificate of counsel of record 
that such affidavit and application are made in 
good faith. 
(d) If the challenged judge questions the sufficiency 
of the allegation of disqualification, he shall 
enter an order directing that a copy thereof be 
forthwith certified to another named judge of the 
same court or of a court of like jurisdiction, 
which judge shall then pass upon the legal 
sufficiency of the allegations. If the challenged 
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judge does not question the legal sufficiency of 
the affidavit, or if the judge to whom the 
affidavit is certified finds that it is legally 
sufficient, another judge shall be called to try 
the case or to conduct the proceeding. If the 
judge to whom the affidavit is certified does not 
find the affidavit to be legally sufficient, he 
shall enter a finding to that effect and the 
challenged judge shall proceed with the case or 
proceeding. 
STATEMENT 
Apart from an expected lack of objectivity, the Appellant's 
statement of the case is sufficiently accurate that restatement 
will only serve to correct details that are less than material. 
The addition, of the following facts from the trial, although 
minimized by Appellant, are considered by Respondent to be 
material. 
1. Appellant has been a master plumber for about 20 years 
and been working at the profession of plumbing for almost 35 
years (Trans, p.85, 1.3-8). 
2. A block wall divides Appellant's yard from the Hopkins' 
yard (Trans., p.113, 1.22). There was no evidence that the 
clean-out located on Hopkins' line but on Appellant's side of 
that wall was accessible to anyone but Appellant. There is 
evidence from which a conclusion can be reached that the City 
employees who discovered the rock were unable to access the yard 
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through the fence and may not in fact have ever seen into 
Appellant's backyard (Trans,, p.42, 1.12-20)• 
3. The object found to be blocking the line was readily 
identifiable by both witnesses who observed it, and there was no 
question in their mind as to what it was (Trans., p.51, p.62). 
The rock was located "right below" or "just past" the clean-out 
on Appellant's side of the fence (Trans., p. 54, 1.25; p. 63, 
1.8). The two witnesses described the rock as almost the same 
diameter as the inside of the pipe (Trans., p. 51, 1.11; p. 62, 
1.22), and one of the witnesses found it to be wedged when he 
attempted to push it with the camera rod (Trans., p. 51, 1.14-
16) . They found it very unlikely that the rock could have 
traveled down the line from the other clean-out over on the 
Hopkins' property (Trans., p. 65, 1. 17-21). 
4. The City employees did not make a video tape of their 
findings in the sewer line because they did not bring with them a 
TV van with capability for video tapes, indicating that there 
would have been a problem getting such van into the Hopkins' 
backyard (Trans., p. 46, 1.16-19). 
5. In September, 1989, some four months after the blockage 
was noted, the rock apparently was no longer in the line. 
Appellant called a witness who observed him running a garden hose 
down the Hopkins sewer line from the clean-out on his property 
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"until he ran out of garden hose" (Trans,, p.73, 1.14). 
Appellant dug up the Hopkins7 sewer line on his property and 
alleges he found a point of constriction where waste material 
could get hung up; he described that as occurring at a point at 
about eight feet downstream from the clean-out (Trans., p. 101, 
1.12) . 
6. There was a showing of animosity between Appellant and 
Mr. and Mrs,. Hopkins, not only in the frequent threats to block 
the sewer line, but through the context in which the statements 
were made (Trans., p.137, 1.16-17). 
ARGUMENT: SUMMARY 
First, there was ample evidence upon which the jury could 
find that (1) the portion of the Hopkins7 sewer line on the 
Appellant's property was not readily accessible to anyone but the 
Appellant, unless it were through the sewer line itself; (2) 
because of his knowledge and accessibility, Appellant had the 
capability to obstruct the sewer line; (3) the sewer was 
blocked by a rock appeared to have been inserted through the 
clean-out on Appellant's property; and (4) the Appellant's 
animosity toward Hopkins, as evidenced by threats to block the 
sewer, provided the Appellant with adequate motivation. 
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Second, it was not necessary to Appellant's case for him to 
present negative evidence that there was no animosity between him 
and Hopkins' tenant, or between him and any other neighbor, when 
animosity toward Hopkins himself was before the court and 
sufficient to show motivation. 
Third, the role of the trial judge in prior litigation 
involving Appellant, and his remarks with regard thereto, did not 
show bias or prejudice on his part, and his refusal to 
voluntarily disqualify himself was not material error. 
ARGUMENT: ELABORATION 
1. Sufficiency of the Evidence. Appellant argues that (1) 
there was no evidence on the issue of whether material deposited 
in the sewer could cause damage, and (2) the circumstantial 
evidence linking Appellant to the blockage was not substantial 
enough to support the verdict. 
(a) The ordinance makes it clear that any material or 
"thing" placed in a public sewer or in any private lateral 
feeding into a public sewer that has a potential for harming or 
disrupting the sewer system can be the basis for criminal 
liability. Issue was made as to whether a rock constitutes such 
material or thing; the evidence that it did in fact block the 
sewer line is sufficient evidence in itself of the deleterious 
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nature of the item. The rock was of a size to plug the sewer 
line entirely (Trans., p.55, 1.7-9) and it was of a rough texture 
(Trans., p.53, 1.25). The potential of such a rock for damage or 
obstruction to a sewer line so as to be harmful is apparent 
without the introduction of further evidence. 
(b) The evidence is circumstantial, at least as to the 
Appellant's involvement, but circumstances were shown from which 
the jury could easily infer the Appellant's guilt. It was the 
best evidence which the nature of the case admitted under the 
circumstances present, and it led to a reasonable inference, not 
a mere suspicion of the Appellant's actions in connection with 
the obstruction. The jury was allowed to consider a reasonable 
alternative hypothesis which it rejected. Evidence showing the 
Appellant's ability and motivation was found to be relevant and 
admitted in evidence. The inference drawn by the jury from the 
evidence presented to it should not be disturbed upon appeal 
unless found to be clearly erroneous. The case cited by 
Appellant, In the Matter of Bartell, 776 P.2d 885 (Utah 1989) not 
only requires the Appellant to "marshal all the evidence" but to 
then demonstrate that despite this evidence the jury verdict is 
"so lacking in support as to be against the clear weight of 
evidence, thus making (it) clearly erroneous", citing State v. 
Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 192-93 (Utah 1987). That was not the case 
with the verdict in this matter; the evidence was sufficient to 
support the verdict. 
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2. Refusal of Evidence Regarding Relationship Between 
Appellant and Others, Appellant argues that testimony of the 
relationship between he and Hopkins' tenant (Ed) was relevant 
under Utah Rules of Evidence 401 and 402, and that the Court's 
refusal to allow its presentation denied him the "right to 
present a defense". In doing so, Appellant confuses testimony 
that shows the absence of a motive with testimony that merely 
narrows the bases for a motive. The Appellant attempted "to 
demonstrate that there was no animosity between Mr. Miller and 
this fellow named Ed" (Trans., p.85, 1.20-22). The Court 
properly ruled that negative evidence with regard to all of the 
circumstances that might have given rise to a motive but did not 
was not relevant. Respondent had presented no evidence to show 
that Appellant would block the sewer line if Respondent sold the 
property to someone of whom he didn't approve; rather, the 
Respondent's evidence showed that Appellant's animosity extended 
to a sale to anyone. Rule of Evidence 403 allows a court to 
exclude evidence if its probative value is substantially 
outweighed by the danger that time will be wasted, and the trial 
court's action is clearly sustainable on that basis. 
3. The Trial Court Committed No Error by Not Recusing 
Itself Because of the Allegation of Bias and Prejudice. Neither 
the trial court nor the judge to which the issue was referred to 
pass upon Appellant's allegations of bias and prejudice felt that 
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the allegations of disqualification were sufficient. Appellant 
now seems to argue that the mere filing of an affidavit alleging 
bias and prejudice creates sufficient aura of perceived 
unfairness so as to mandate recusal. He relies primarily upon 
sentiments expressed by Justice Wade in a concurring opinion in 
Haslam v. Morrison, 190 P.2d 520 (Utah 1948). That position is 
not the applicable law, and unless there was in fact bias or 
prejudice so as to disqualify the judge, no error was committed. 
The standard inquiry required by the cases dealing with the 
question of bias or prejudice is "whether a reasonable person 
would have a reasonable basis for questioning the judge's 
impartiality." In re Beard, 811 F.2d 818 (1st Cir. 1987); 
United States v. Hines, 696 F.2d 722, 728 (10th Cir. 1982). The 
Utah statute commits a decision to recuse to the sound discretion 
of the trial judge and the reviewing Circuit Court judge. 
Reversal by this court should only occur in the event of an abuse 
of that discretion. Varela v. Jones, 746 F.2d 1413 (10th Cir. 
1984); United States v. Page, 828 F.2d 1476 (10th Cir. 1987). 
An affidavit of bias and prejudice is strictly construed against 
the affiant, and there is a substantial burden on the moving 
party to demonstrate the judge is not impartial. United States 
v. Hall, 121 F.Supp. 508, 534, aff'd, 536 F.2d 313 (10th Cir.), 
cert, denied, 429 U.S. 919, 97 S.Ct. 313, 50 L.Ed.2d 285 (1976). 
See also United States v. Hines, supra. Appellant has not met 
that burden. 
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There is as much obligation for a judge not to recuse when there 
is no occasion for him to do so as there is for him to do so when 
there is such occasion. Brody v. President & Fellows of Harvard 
College, 664 F.2d 10, 12 (1st Cir. 1981), 455 U.S. 1027, 102 
S.Ct. 1731, 72 L.Ed.2d 148 (1982); United States v. Haldeman. 
559 F.2d 31, 139 n. 360 (D.C. Cir. 1976), 431 U.S. 933, 97 S.Ct. 
2641, 53 L.Ed.2d 250 (1977); United States v. Brav, 546 F.2d 
851, 857 (10th Cir. 1976); Danielson v. Winnfield Funeral Home, 
Inc. , 634 F.Supp. 1110, 1116 (E.D. La. 1986); Dulanev v. 
Winnfield Funeral Home, 820 F.2d 1222 (5th Cir. 1987); In re A. 
H. Robins, Co. , 602 F.Supp. 243, 245 (D. Kan. 1985). A judge 
should not recuse himself on unsupported, irrational, or highly 
tenuous speculation. United States v. Greenough, 782 F.2d 1556, 
1558 (11th Cir. 1986); Davis v. Commissioner, 734 F.2d 1302, 
1303 (8th Cir. 1984) (affidavits based on conclusions, opinions, 
and rumors are insufficient for recusal); In re United States, 
666 F.2d 690, 695 (1st Cir. 1981) (though public confidence may 
be as shaken by published inferences ofr bias that are false as by 
those which are true, judge considering disqualification must 
ignore rumors, innuendos, and erroneous information). 
The only specific instance given in support of the effort to 
disqualify the trial judge is the Order of July 18, 1989, p. 9 of 
the Respondent's Addendum, which refers to a previous case 
involving the same parties (but different facts) where the same 
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judge had previously presided• Yet the cases hold that what a 
judge learns or comes to believe in his judicial capacity "is a 
proper basis for judicial observations, and the use of such 
information is not the kind of matter that results in 
disqualification," United States v. Bernstein, 533 F.2d 775, 785 
(2d Cir.)/ cert, denied, 429 US 998, 97 S.Ct. 523, 50 L.Ed.2d 608 
(1976) . The comments do not indicate that the judge formed an 
opinion on the basis of his involvement in the prior case that in 
any way predisposed him so as to create a bias or prejudice. 
United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 US 563, 583, 86 S.Ct. 1698, 
16 L.Ed.2d 778 (1966). A determination of bias under the Rule 
applicable here must be based on extrajudicial conduct, not 
conduct arising in a trial setting. Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc. 
v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 861 F.2d 1307 (1st Cir. 
1989) . 
While clearly not a ground under the Utah Rule, the judge's 
relationship to attorney for the Respondent is raised as a factor 
to be considered. The cases hold that bias against a lawyer, 
even if found to exist, is not bias against his client unless it 
is so "virulent" as to spill over against the client. U.S. v. 
Jacobs, 855 F.2d 652 (9th Cir. 1988); Drexel Burnham Lambert, 
Inc. v. Securities and Exchange Commission, supra. By the same 
reasoning, bias for an attorney, even if it were presumed to 
exist because of the relationship, cannot automatically be 
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presumed to be bias against the Respondent or the basis for 
disqualification. 
CONCLUSION 
Respondent challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, but 
he fails to bear the burden of showing that there was not 
competent evidence to support the verdict of the jury. The 
Supreme Court,s discussion of the degree of proof necessary to 
support a jury verdict in Utah State Road Commission v. Steele 
Ranch, 533 P. 2d 888 at 890 (Utah 1975) is still applicable and 
provides the criteria by which the sufficiency of the evidence 
should be examined. The evidence here is not inconsequential. 
The court did not deprive Appellant of a defense by refusing to 
allow him to show the relationship between himself and the 
neighbor's tenant when that testimony was not relevant in light 
of the motive relied upon by Respondent. Further, the trial 
judge committed no error in refusing to disqualify himself as 
there was in fact no showing of bias and prejudice toward 
Respondent on the part of that judge. There is no error in the 
proceedings below that would mandate a reversal by this court. 
DATED this 26th day qf\ftarch, 19^0. 
T/~W. SHUMWAY \ 
Attorney for City of St. George 
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